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Abstract
We test the hypothesis that underwriters set higher gross spreads and deeper offer price discounts in seasoned 
equity offers of firms exhibiting weak shareholder rights as compensation for increased reputational risk and legal 
liability. Alternatively, if market participants are fully aware of the risks related to weak shareholder rights and 
efficiently price them, then underwriters arguably do not need to adjust issuance costs for firms with weak 
governance. Our results indicate that, on average, shareholder rights and direct issue costs are unrelated, 
supporting an efficient pricing view. However, upon closer examination, we find that underwriters charge higher 
gross spreads when the issuing firm has either an extremely low level of shareholder rights or a substantially lower 
level than expected, which are likely the cases in which the underwriter’s reputational risk is highest.
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1 Introduction
Prior studies report that the strength of shareholder rights affects the direct costs of debt 
financing.1 Klock et  al. (2005) find that strong antitakeover provisions (i.e. weak share-
holder rights) are associated with a lower cost of debt financing than are weak antitakeo-
ver provisions (i.e. strong shareholder rights). They conclude that bondholders view anti-
takeover provisions as a mechanism to protect their interests. Chava et al. (2009) find that 
firms more vulnerable to takeovers (i.e. stronger shareholder rights) pay higher spreads on 
their bank loans than firms with weaker shareholder rights. They argue that the higher loan 
spreads are caused by the increased financial risk that would stem from a potential takeo-
ver. Relative to the link between shareholder rights and the direct costs of debt issuance, 
the link between shareholder rights and the direct costs of raising equity is theoretically 
less clear, and the empirical evidence on the latter is sparse.2 We motivate an empirical 
investigation of the following question: do weaker shareholder rights increase the direct 
cost of seasoned equity offers (SEOs)? Our goal is to answer this question by studying the 
link between the strength of shareholder rights and SEO gross spreads and offer price dis-
counts set by the investment bank that underwrites the issuance.3
In the context of equity offers, investment banks certify the validity of the issuing firm’s 
stock price. The possibility that an investment bank will bring an overvalued issuer to the 
market creates the potential for reputational damage and legal liability.4 To the extent that 
weak shareholder rights insulate managers and increase the potential for agency conflicts, 
it seems plausible that investment banks are more cautious in dealing with equity issuing 
firms that have weaker shareholder rights. This would seem especially so in light of the 
fact that seasoned equity offers generate a substantial cash flow, adding to the potential for 
agency problems. As we elaborate below, a particular bank might choose to protect itself 
by charging higher gross spreads or setting the offer price at a considerable discount from 
current market value for issuers that have weaker shareholder rights.
Our primary hypothesis is motivated by the vast literature that examines the linkage 
of corporate governance mechanisms with information asymmetry between managers 
and investors. For example, Becker-Blease and Irani (2008), Cai et al. (2006), Hillier and 
McColgan (2006), Kanagaretnam et  al. (2007) and Holm and Schøler (2010) document 
that board independence helps reduce asymmetric information. Peasnell et al. (2005) finds 
that board independence improves the integrity of financial statements. Wruck (1993) 
and Kang et  al. (2006) examine the importance of the form of executive compensation 
in reducing asymmetric information. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Perotti and 
1 Shareholder rights are typically measured using the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003), in which 
firms with more anti-takeover provisions are associated with weaker shareholder rights.
2 Some exceptions include Cheng et al. (2006).
3 A separate stream of research examines whether shareholder rights influence stock returns/firm valuation. 
Some studies find that strong shareholder rights are associated with abnormally high returns/higher valua-
tion (e.g., Gompers et al. 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Luo and Hachiya 2005; Bebchuk et al. 2009; Lee 
and Lee 2009). Other studies argue that differences in shareholder rights do not result in abnormal stock 
returns (e.g., Core et al. 2006; Johnson et al. 2009).
4 Overvalued issuers are those for which insiders’ private valuation is lower than the consensus valuation of 
outside investors, the latter of which is reflected in the current stock price.
Thadden (2003), Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009) find that 
large shareholders can reduce asymmetric information and help improve long-term perfor-
mance. To the extent that shareholders’ rights are an alternative external governance tool, 
we expect the presence of weak shareholder rights to exacerbate the problem of asymmet-
ric information and increase the risk of underwriters bringing an overvalued issuer to the 
market.
More specifically, Booth and Smith’s (1986) certification hypothesis asserts that 
underwriters stake their reputational capital to certify that the offer price reflects poten-
tially adverse inside information. If weaker shareholder rights increase the effort needed 
for underwriters to provide adequate certification, it seems reasonable that an underwriter 
would charge higher spreads to compensate for the extra effort. Similarly, Tinic’s (1988) 
implicit insurance hypothesis states that underpricing is an implicit insurance premium that 
protects underwriters against legal liability and damage to reputational capital. Essentially, 
if there is a significant possibility that the issuer’s stock price is overvalued, pricing a sea-
soned offer at a deeper discount from current market value helps to ensure that the newly 
issued shares are not overpriced. If weaker shareholder rights increase the potential for 
overvaluation, then underwriters might set offer prices at deeper discounts for these firms. 
These arguments form the basis for the hypothesis that weaker shareholder rights are asso-
ciated with higher gross spreads or deeper offer price discounts.
Alternatively, it is possible that investment banks believe that investors efficiently price 
the impact of shareholder rights on firm valuation. If prices accurately reflect shareholder 
rights, then the bank’s risk of experiencing reputational and legal troubles due to under-
writing offers of overvalued firms are not associated with the strength of shareholder rights. 
These arguments lead to the alternative hypothesis that the strength of shareholder rights is 
not associated with gross spreads or offer price discounts. Consistent with this alternative 
view, a number of studies find that firms characterized by weaker shareholder rights are 
associated with lower market valuations (e.g., Gompers et al. 2003; Chi 2005; Chua et al. 
2007; Bebchuk et al. 2009), although there is evidence that low valuations cause firms to 
adopt more anti-takeover provisions, not vice versa (Lehn et al. 2007). In the specific con-
text of seasoned equity offers, Kim and Purnanandam (2014) find that weak corporate gov-
ernance is the primary reason why investors react negatively to SEO announcements. In 
effect, weak governance lowers the stock price of poorly governed firms before the under-
writer prices the actual issue. Viewing this finding in the context of our study, it is possible 
that the stock price penalty for SEO issuers with weak governance is severe enough that 
underwriters of such deals do not face additional risk of issuing overvalued shares. If so, 
we would expect that the strength of shareholder rights is unrelated to gross spreads and 
offer price discounts.
Gross underwriter spreads and offer price discounts are relatively large and easily meas-
ured. Gross spreads are measured as a percentage of total offer proceeds. They average 
roughly 5% and—unlike the spreads paid in initial public offers—vary considerably across 
offers. Offer price discounts reflect the percentage reduction in the offer price in relation 
to the closing secondary market price on the prior day. Discounts average 2–3% and also 
display considerable cross-sectional variation.
Our empirical tests use a sample of 702 SEOs (by 495 firms) during 1992–2014. We 
conduct OLS estimations in which we regress the direct cost measures against the strength 
of shareholder rights and several control variables. Our measures of shareholder rights 
include the G-index of Gompers et al. (2003), the entrenchment index (E-index) of Beb-
chuk et al. (2009), and the alternative governance index (ATI) of Cremers and Nair (2005). 
Using the G-index and E-index, we find that gross spreads are significantly influenced by 
the strength of shareholder rights, but only when the firm has an extreme level of weak 
shareholder rights, defined as having 14 or more provisions in the G-index (out of 24) and 
having all six provisions in the E-index. We find no such effect, however, for SEO dis-
counts. The ATI has only three levels and extreme levels do not influence discounts or 
the gross spreads, perhaps because three antitakeover provisions are not enough to detect 
extremely weak shareholder rights.
The strength of shareholder rights could be endogenous with the need for governance 
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985). For example, prior studies find that stronger shareholder rights 
are associated with smaller firms, greater idiosyncratic risk, and lower institutional hold-
ings (Gompers et al. (2003); Ferreira and Laux 2007; Cremers and Nair 2005). To account 
for this, we decompose the strength of shareholder rights into the portion associated with 
firm traits (“predicted shareholder rights”) and the portion that is orthogonal to firm traits 
(“residual shareholder rights”). The estimations reveal that underwriters charge firms with 
excess positive residual G-index higher gross spreads, but we find no evidence of the pre-
dicted or residual E-index or ATI influencing spreads or discounts.
We provide additional tests that include board characteristics because it is possible that 
shareholder rights interact with other governance mechanisms. We include variables that 
capture board size, board independence and the presence of insiders on the board. Of par-
ticular note, we find some evidence that larger boards are associated with lower issue costs. 
This finding is difficult to interpret, however, because board size could reflect tradeoffs 
between firm-specific costs and benefits of monitoring (e.g., Boone et al. 2007). The inclu-
sion of board variables, however, does not alter our findings that extremely weak share-
holder rights are associated with higher gross spreads.
In sum, our main result is that shareholder rights do not have a significant impact on the 
direct costs of raising equity capital, except for firms with very weak shareholder rights 
(i.e. high antitakeover protection). This suggests that underwriters believe stock prices of 
seasoned issuers already reflect the strength of shareholder rights in general, and thus they 
do not adjust spreads or discounts on that basis. However, they charge higher spreads for 
certifying firms with extremely weak shareholder rights, arguably in cases when their repu-
tational capital is most vulnerable. The non-significant result for the average SEO firm is 
consistent with the result of Johnson et al. (2009) that sorting by shareholder rights does 
not generate abnormal returns, implying efficient pricing with respect to this measure. This 
view is also in line with recent evidence reported by Kim and Purnanandam (2014) that 
weak governance is priced at the SEO announcement. Our results suggest that underwriters 
believe that they incur additional risks only in SEOs of firms with very weak shareholder 
rights and therefore require additional compensation to bring these issues to the market.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and descriptive 
evidence. Section 3 provides the main results of the paper. Section 4 concludes.
5 A related study by Lin and Ulupinar (2013) reports that SEO underwriting spreads are positively related 
to shareholder rights. Our paper differs in the sense that we account for the fact that the strength of govern-
ance is endogenous with the need for governance (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985). For example, stronger 
shareholder rights are associated with smaller firms, greater residual volatility, and lower institutional hold-
ings (Gompers et al. 2003; Cremers and Nair 2005; Ferreira and Laux 2007). This part of our analysis leads 
to the key result that underwriters charge more when shareholder rights deviate from expected levels. See 
our Sect. 3.3. Compared to Lin and Ulupinar (2013), we also focus our analysis on primary share issues 
and exclude firms from regulated industries (financials and utilities) and use a longer time horizon for the 
sample.
2  Sample, variables, and descriptive statistics
2.1  Sample and variables
The dataset consists of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) of common stocks from 1992 
to 2014 conducted by firms for which current shareholder rights data are available. We 
exclude unit and rights offers. We also exclude offers made by financial firms and utili-
ties, since the costs of raising equity and the level of shareholder rights of these companies 
are likely to differ from those of industrial firms due to regulation. We also require that 
the firm sells at least some primary shares and the offer price is higher than $1. Seasoned 
offering data are collected from SDC’s New Issues Database.
Shareholder rights data are obtained from RiskMetrics. The legacy dataset, available 
until 2005, includes 24 antitakeover provisions that comprise the G-index. These provi-
sions relate to voting rights, delaying hostile bidders, director/officer protection, other 
takeover defenses and state laws. We form the G-index following Gompers et  al. (2003) 
by adding one point for each anti-takeover provision that a firm has in place. Thus higher 
values correspond to weaker shareholder rights. The G-index is available starting in 1990 
and is updated every 2 or 3 years (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004). The 
data collection methodology was substantially changed starting 2006. While data is avail-
able more frequently, annually, the number of provisions collected is much fewer and the 
G-index is no longer calculated. However, the six key provisions that constitute Bebchuk 
et al. (2009) entrenchment index (E-index) and the three key antitakeover provisions that 
constitute Cremers and Nair’s (2005) alternative governance index (ATI) are available for 
the full time period.
We examine SEO gross underwriter spreads and offer price discounts. The gross spread 
consists of the management fee, underwriter fee, and selling concession and is quoted 
as a percentage of total offer proceeds. Following prior studies, we define the offer price 
discount as the return from the previous day’s closing transaction price to the offer price 
(close-to-offer return), multiplied by negative one. This definition is intuitive because sea-
soned issuers have observable secondary market prices prior to the offer and underwriters 
can price offerings with reference to this point. Control variables are constructed using 
data from CRSP, Compustat, IBES, Thomson Financial, and RiskMetrics. These variables 
represent factors that are known to be associated with the direct costs of issuing equity or 
shareholder rights. Variable definitions are presented in the Appendix.
2.2  Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides the annual frequency of all firms for which antitakeover data are avail-
able along with the cross-sectional means of antitakeover measures. The average number 
of antitakeover provisions has increased over time, particularly in the case of the E-index in 
the last 8 years. Throughout our analysis we control for time effects to alleviate the concern 
that this increase influences our findings.
Table  2 provides descriptive statistics for firm and issue characteristics. The median 
level of the ATI is 2, which is high given that this measure incorporates only three key 
provisions. The median level for the E-Index is 3 and for the G-Index is 9. By the nature of 
variable construction, the more antitakeover provisions included in a particular index, the 
larger is that index’s variation. The mean (median) gross spread and discount are 4.21% 
(4.50%) and 2.75% (1.87%). The average firm has a leverage of 31%, market-to-book ratio 
of 1.79, and institutional holdings of 54%. The average firm is followed by 9.67 analysts, 
which is high but not surprising given that antitakeover provisions are collected for large 
well-known companies. The average issue size is 14% relative to total shares outstanding, 
and is preceded by 13% market-adjusted abnormal 60-day returns.
3  Results
In this section we provide empirical tests of the association between the strength of share-
holder rights and two direct costs of issuing equity: gross spreads and offer price dis-
counts. The motivation for why these cost variables might be associated with shareholder 
rights relates to Booth and Smith’s (1986) certification hypothesis and Tinic’s (1988) 
implicit insurance hypothesis. Booth and Smith (1986) assert that underwriters stake their 
Table 1  Annual frequency of 
SEOs and the level of external 
governance
This table displays the annual number of SEOs during 1992–2014 for 
which antitakeover measures are available along with the average ATI, 
E-index and G-index values per year. The ATI is the alternative gov-
ernance index of Cremers and Nair (2005), which focuses on three key 
provisions (staggered boards, poison pills, and restrictions on share-
holder voting). The E-index is the entrenchment index of Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), which focuses on six provisions within the 
G-index. The G-index is formed following Gompers et  al. (2003) by 
adding one point for each anti-takeover provision (of the 24 provisions 
in IRRC) that a firm has in place
Issue year # of SEOs ATI E-index G-index
1992 35 1.89 2.71 10.03
1993 36 1.81 2.22 9.58
1994 27 1.74 2.19 8.26
1996 20 2.15 2.70 9.70
1997 17 2.00 2.18 8.71
1998 21 1.76 2.19 8.00
1999 33 1.97 2.24 8.42
2000 35 2.06 2.23 8.34
2001 17 2.41 3.00 10.47
2002 55 1.96 2.69 9.00
2003 50 1.96 2.64 9.14
2004 60 2.30 3.03 9.50
2005 31 1.97 2.65 9.03
2006 24 2.21 4.21 –
2007 33 2.06 3.79 –
2008 24 2.38 4.33 –
2009 71 2.04 4.73 –
2010 24 2.13 5.42 –
2011 21 2.29 5.43 –
2012 21 2.29 5.19 –
2013 30 1.87 4.93 –
2014 17 2.24 5.06 –
702 2.07 3.44 9.09
reputational capital to certify that the offer price reflects potentially adverse inside informa-
tion. Booth and Smith argue that this information is firm-specific, and therefore the amount 
of compensation charged by underwriters (either through spreads or discounts) should be 
an increasing function of firm-specific risk. Tinic (1988) suggests that underpricing is an 
implicit insurance premium that protects underwriters against legal liability and damage to 
reputational capital. Following these arguments, we posit that weaker shareholder rights 
should be reflected in higher gross spreads or deeper offer price discounts. Alternatively, it 
is possible that underwriters believe that shareholder rights are already reflected in stocks 
prices. In this case, an underwriter’s risk is not related to shareholder rights and thus the 
underwriter does not adjust the gross spread or offer price discount based on the degree of 
shareholder rights.
3.1  Spreads, discounts, and shareholder rights
Table 3 displays gross spreads and offer price discounts within different levels of antitakeo-
ver measures. For the ATI and E-Index, we report these issue cost variables for firms at 
each level, i.e., 0–3 for the ATI and 0–6 for the E-index. For the G-Index we report the 
issue cost variables within Democracy firms with five or fewer antitakeover provisions, 
Dictatorship firms with 14 or more provisions, and the remainder of firms with between 6 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics
This table presents firm and offer characteristics for the sample SEOs. The gross underwriting spread con-
sists of the management fee, underwriter fee, and selling concession and is expressed as a percentage of 
total offer proceeds. The offer price discount is measured as the return from the previous day’s closing 
transaction price to the offer price (close-to-offer return), multiplied by negative one. All variables are 
defined in the Appendix
Variable N 25th Pctl Mean Median 75th Pctl SD
ATI 702 2.00 2.05 2.00 3.00 0.81
E-index 702 2.00 3.38 3.00 5.00 1.53
G-Index 437 7.00 9.11 9.00 11.00 2.78
Gross spread (%) 702 3.51 4.21 4.50 5.00 1.32
Discount (%) 702 0.52 2.75 1.87 3.69 3.48
Market capitalization (thousands) 702 573,629 4,506,863 1,125,537 2,761,102 17,067,662
Leverage 702 0.17 0.31 0.30 0.43 0.20
Overnight offer 702 0.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.48
Relative offer size 702 0.07 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.09
Market-to-book 702 0.59 1.79 1.01 2.21 1.95
Residual volatility 702 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01
Turnover 702 6.52 33.43 11.86 25.08 75.01
Proceeds 702 77.00 252.62 131.60 261.00 349.47
Runup 702 − 0.04 0.13 0.08 0.23 0.28
Offer price 702 16.00 31.03 26.15 40.00 21.63
Nasdaq 702 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.48
Analyst following 702 5.00 9.67 8.00 13.00 6.87
Institutional holdings 702 0.08 0.54 0.65 0.83 0.36
Bond rating 702 0.00 3.06 0.00 6.00 4.06
and 13 provisions. This classification follows Gompers et al. (2003). The univariate rela-
tion between Gross spread (Discount) and shareholder rights seems inconsistent across 
the different index measures, possibly because different antitakeover provisions counted 
or ignored by the different indexes can have differing effect on the cost of equity issues. 
Moreover, these statistics can be misleading because firm characteristics that are known 
to be associated with the adopted level of shareholder rights are also known to influence 
the gross spread and offer price discount. For example, greater idiosyncratic volatility is 
associated with stronger shareholder rights, larger gross spreads, and deeper offer price dis-
counts (Ferreira and Laux 2007). Subsequent tests control for firm and offer characteristics.
3.2  Simultaneous estimations using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
We conduct simultaneous regression estimations that examine the influence of antitakeover 
indexes on the gross underwriter spread and offer price discount in a multivariate setting. 
In particular, we model the Gross Spread and Discount simultaneously using the Seem-
ingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) technique to account for the possibility that they are 
jointly determined. The estimations are as follows:
Table 3  Gross spreads and offer price discounts for different levels of shareholder rights
This table displays gross underwriter spreads (%) and offer price discounts (%) within different levels of 
antitakeover indices. Lowest index levels represent firms with the fewest antitakeover provisions (i.e., 
strongest shareholder rights) and highest index levels represent firms with the most antitakeover provisions 
(i.e., weakest shareholder rights).The G-index is separated into Democracies (G-Index ≤ 5), medium levels 
of the index, and Dictatorships (G-Index ≥ 14), following Gompers et  al. (2003). The gross underwriter 
spread consists of the management fee, underwriter fee, and selling concession and is expressed as a per-
centage of total offer proceeds. The offer price discount is the return from the previous day’s closing trans-
action price to the offer price (close-to-offer return), multiplied by negative one
N Mean gross 
spread
Median gross 
spread
Mean discount Median discount
ATI
0 24 4.75 5.00 3.33 3.35
1 141 4.30 4.55 2.63 1.62
2 313 4.19 4.50 3.04 2.03
3 224 4.12 4.50 2.37 1.75
E-Index
0 10 4.88 5.29 2.33 0.64
1 71 4.46 4.50 2.43 1.44
2 146 4.24 4.73 2.46 1.64
3 140 4.10 4.50 2.75 2.00
4 157 4.06 4.26 2.36 1.78
5 108 4.05 4.31 3.32 2.46
6 70 4.60 4.75 3.74 2.06
G-Index
Democracy (G ≤ 5) 47 4.75 5.00 2.80 1.80
5 < G < 14 361 4.17 4.50 2.80 1.92
Dictatorship (G ≥ 14) 29 4.29 4.50 1.66 0.80
We conduct three separate SUR estimations based on Eqs. (a) and (b), one for each govern-
ance index, where the key variables of interest are ATI, E-Index, and G-index. The terms 
X and Y represent vectors of control variables and the regression employs year and indus-
try fixed effects. The variable Discount is missing for 11 of the 702 sample observations, 
and thus the joint estimation uses the remaining 691 observations. Control variables in 
the Gross Spread models include factors that have been shown to influence gross spreads 
(e.g., Butler et al. 2005) and include market capitalization, residual volatility, relative offer 
size, a Nasdaq indicator, share abnormal returns in the 60 days prior to the issue, market 
returns in the 60 days prior to the issue, market-to-book, share turnover, the number of lead 
managers, underwriter ranking, and the firm’s bond rating (and an indicator reflecting no 
available bond rating). Institutional holdings can be associated with issue costs because 
marketing shares is easier if the firm already has a wide shareholder base and high liquid-
ity. Moreover, high institutional ownership represents an implicit control mechanism as 
institutions can “vote with their feet”, i.e. sell their shares if they are not satisfied with 
the managements’ policies. Analyst following can reduce issue costs by reducing informa-
tion asymmetry and increasing transparency. Having a previous relationship with the lead 
underwriter can result in lower issue costs if the underwriter faces less severe due diligence 
problems due to familiarity with the issuer, or alternatively, can lead to higher issue costs 
if switching results in more competitive pricing. We also include an indicator for overnight 
offers because these are conducted on an accelerated basis (within two trading days of the 
announcement) with limited marketing and therefore typically with lower underwriter 
compensation and higher discounts. Models of the offer price discount control for each of 
these factors and also control for abnormal returns in the prior 5 days (AR5pos; AR5neg) 
and integer pricing because these additional variables are shown to influence offer price 
discounts (e.g., Altinkilic and Hansen 2003; Corwin 2003; Kim and Shin 2004; Mola and 
Loughran 2004).
Table  4 reports the results of the three SUR estimations. In each case, the estimates 
indicate that there is no significant association between antitakeover indexes and either the 
gross spread or offer price discount, on average. Moreover, neither issue cost variable sig-
nificantly  influences the other, thus there is no evidence that Gross Spread and Discount 
are jointly determined. The control variables show that the gross spread is inversely related 
to the market capitalization of the issuer, analyst following, offer price, and overnight 
offers, and is positively associated with residual volatility, the number of lead underwriters, 
and having no bond rating. Moreover, the offer price discount is inversely related to offer 
proceeds, offer price, and institutional holdings, and positively associated with overnight 
offers, relative offer size, market capitalization, residual volatility, and no bond rating.
The results of these estimations indicate that a firm’s direct cost of raising equity is not 
affected by its level of shareholder rights, on average. It seems that any incremental effort 
in certification (or additional reputational or legal risks) resulting from weak shareholder 
rights is not sufficient for the underwriter to require further compensation from the issuing 
firm. A likely explanation is that on average investors efficiently price the value of share-
holder rights prior to the issue such that the bank’s risk of issuing overvalued shares is no 
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greater for firms with weak shareholder rights than it is for firms with strong shareholder 
rights.
In Table 5, we focus on firms with extremely weak shareholder rights instead of focus-
ing on averages. Specifically, we replace the governance index variables with indicators 
for firms that have the highest level of ATI (three provisions; 224 such firms), E-Index (six 
provisions; 70 firms), or are Dictatorships (G ≥ 14; 29 firms). In the latter case, we control 
for whether the firm is a Democracy (G ≤ 5; 47 firms). Estimations are conducted as in 
Table 4 with SUR estimations using the same jointly determined system of equations and 
employing the same control variables. In the first SUR estimation, reported in Models (1a) 
and (1b) of Table 5, we find no evidence that firms with ATI = 3 pay significantly differ-
ent gross spreads compared to other firms. This result is not surprising (given that Table 4 
shows no relation, on average) because close to one-third of firms fall in this category. 
The next two SUR estimations [Models (2a) and (2b); and Models (3a) and (3b)], how-
ever, provide evidence that firms with the weakest shareholder rights (most antitakeover 
provisions) pay higher gross underwriting spreads. Firms with six E-Index provisions pay 
0.43% higher underwriting spreads compared to firms with fewer provisions and Dicta-
torships pay 0.46% higher spreads compared to other firms. The results are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. These estimates can be interpreted as evidence that underwrit-
ers charge a higher gross spread for firms with extremely weak shareholder rights due to 
increased reputational or legal risk. Interestingly, there is some weak evidence (10% level) 
that underwriters charge more from Democracy firms compared to firms with less extreme 
levels. With respect to the Discount, the estimations provide no evidence that this meas-
ure of issuance costs is impacted by shareholder rights even in the extreme cases of weak 
shareholder rights.
The estimates in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the Gross Spread and Discount are not 
jointly determined. Thus the remainder of the paper presents results by modeling the two 
variables separately. We note that the results in Tables 4 and 5 are similar if we model the 
Gross Spread and Discount with separate estimations.
3.3  Estimations of the expected level of governance
The strength of governance might be endogenous with the need for governance (e.g., 
Demsetz and Lehn 1985). The literature identifies several factors that are associated with 
the level of shareholder rights. Stronger rights are associated with smaller firms, greater 
residual volatility, and lower institutional holdings (Gompers et al. 2003; Cremers and Nair 
2005; Ferreira and Laux 2007). The absolute level of shareholder rights might therefore 
not be as informative as the relative deviations from a firm-specific optimum. Assuming 
that firms, on average, adopt a level of shareholder rights that is warranted based on firm 
characteristics, we can estimate the optimal level for each firm. Deviations from this opti-
mal level can be considered too strong or too weak, potentially increasing the underwriter’s 
certification effort and thus the cost of issuing equity.6 As noted throughout the paper, we 
6 This approach of examining deviations from predicted levels of shareholder rights follows Autore et al. 
(2009), who examine whether shareholder rights are reflected in analyst recommendations and find that 
analysts give more favorable recommendations to firms with stronger shareholder rights, but only when 
strong shareholder rights are expected. Their findings indicate that shareholder rights might not always be 
priced efficiently. In the context of our study, it is possible that there is an association between shareholder 
rights and gross spreads/discounts when shareholder rights are unexpectedly weak if investors do not effi-
ciently price unexpectedly weak shareholder rights before an equity offer takes place.
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believe that a deviation indicating weaker than expected shareholder rights is of primary 
concern for investment banks whose risk is in underwriting offers of overvalued issuers.
To test for these effects, we decompose the strength of shareholder rights into predicted 
and residual components and include these components in tests of the relation between 
equity issue costs and shareholder rights. We decompose shareholder rights by conducting 
an OLS estimation of each antitakeover index regressed on the natural logarithm of mar-
ket capitalization, a Nasdaq indicator, turnover, residual volatility, market-to-book, insti-
tutional holdings, and leverage. We include leverage to control for debtholder monitoring. 
From this estimation we obtain the part of the index associated with firm characteristics 
and the part orthogonal to firm traits.
Next, we re-estimate the models in Table 4 after replacing the level of shareholder rights 
with the predicted shareholder rights and residual shareholder rights. The residual index is 
the actual index minus the predicted index, and represents the deviation of the actual index 
level from that predicted by firm traits. We split this residual index into positive and nega-
tive components. The positive residual index captures deviations that reflect poorer govern-
ance than predicted, since a higher index reflects poorer governance. The negative residual 
index picks up deviations that reflect better governance than predicted.
Table 6 provides OLS estimates of the SEO issue costs regressed against the predicted 
indexes, the positive and negative components of the residual indexes, and other factors 
that are known to be associated with issue costs. The estimates reveal that the residual, 
or unexpected, part of firms’ shareholder rights has significant impact on Gross spreads 
for the G-Index. Perhaps we don’t find the same significance in deviations from other pre-
dicted indices because those indices have a narrower scope and therefore less overall var-
iations in the deviations, even though the coefficient signs are consistent. Based on the 
G-Index, underwriters charge firms with poorer than warranted shareholder rights a higher 
gross spread and firms with better than expected shareholder rights a lower gross spread. 
This finding does not extend to offer price discounts.
3.4  Pairwise estimations that examine changes across a firm’s offers
Our models of the SEO gross spread and discount control for several variables: relative 
offer size, overnight offering, market capitalization, market-to-book, residual volatility, 
turnover, proceeds, stock price run-up, market returns, offer price, number of lead manag-
ers, Nasdaq listing, analyst following, institutional holdings, and bond ratings. Neverthe-
less, as with any empirical study, it is hard to rule out the possibility that our estimations 
suffer from an omitted variable bias. To alleviate this concern, we devise a pairwise test 
by exploiting the fact that several sample firms conduct multiple SEOs within our sample 
period. Specifically, we have 130 firms with two or more offers in our sample; the largest 
number of offers by a firm is ten. We create a sample in which we pair each offer with each 
of the previous offers of the same firm. This results in 349 pairs of offers conducted by 
the same firm. Next, we calculate the difference in issuance costs and firm characteristics 
between the later and earlier offer in each pair. The change in the particular variable equals 
the value of the variable at the time of the later offer minus the value at the time of the 
earlier offer. Finally, we estimate a regression in which we use paired differences to explain 
the change in a firm’s issue costs with changes in firm and offer traits. This estimation 
method helps to alleviate concerns about omitted firm-specific factors.
Table  7 provides the results. The explanatory variable of interest is the measure of 
extreme shareholder rights, reflected by the change in either Max(ATI), Max(E-Index), or 
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Dictatorship. For example, ΔDictatorship takes the value of one if the firm was not a dic-
tatorship in its prior offer but is a dictatorship (more anti-takeover measures) in its latter 
offer, 0 if it did not change its dictatorship status across offers, and − 1 if it was a dictator-
ship in its earlier offer but not in its latter offer. The estimates indicate, for each of the three 
measures, that a particular firm pays a higher gross spread after it adopts anti-takeover 
measures that weaken its shareholder rights to an extreme level, ceteris paribus.
3.5  Controlling for board characteristics
The analysis so far concentrates exclusively on external shareholder rights. However, there 
are other facets of corporate governance, and the literature provides evidence that vari-
ous governance mechanisms (e.g., analyst following, institutional holdings, board charac-
teristics) interact with each other (Smith and Watts 1992; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001; 
Himmelberg et  al. 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Lehn et  al. 2009; Boone et  al. 
2007; Cornett et  al. 2007; Jiraporn et  al. 2006; Knyazeva 2008). The inclusion of these 
governance mechanisms in our analysis can sharpen our inferences regarding the effect of 
shareholder rights on issue costs, as well as provide insight about how underwriters view 
these mechanisms.7 The results presented in the previous sections control for analyst fol-
lowing and institutional holdings, and provide evidence that underwriters charge a lower 
gross spread in offers by firms with greater analyst following. A potential reason is that 
underwriters have less reputational and legal pressure when investors have more informa-
tion intermediaries that provide information about the firm.
Table 8 provides correlations between governance indexes, control variables, and board 
variables. Shareholder rights tend to be weaker when the board has a large percentage of 
independent directors and is relatively large, whereas rights tend to be stronger when the 
percentage of insiders on the board is high. The potential substitution effect of external and 
internal governance motivates us to control for board characteristics in our estimations.
Panel A of Table 9 includes a variable representing the percentage of independent board 
members, the number of board members minus its median, 9, and a variable constructed 
by taking the squared difference of board size minus the median number of directors [i.e., 
the square of (board size minus 9)]. The latter variable is designed to control for non-lin-
earities in the relationship between board size and board productivity. Panel B of Table 9 
replaces board independence with a variable indicating the percentage of insider board 
members. These two variables have a high correlation (− 69%) and including them in the 
same regression introduces the potential for multicollinearity. Note that board variables are 
available only for about 60% of our sample.
Similar to our baseline tests, the estimates indicate that after controlling for inter-
nal governance based on several board measures, firms with extremely weak shareholder 
rights pay higher gross spreads, but shareholder rights do not affect offer price discounts. 
With respect to board variables, in one Gross Spread estimation we find that firms with a 
larger board size pay lower gross spreads, and in two Discount models we find that greater 
7 In unreported, results we model Gross Spread and Discount while adding a proxy for debtholder moni-
toring. Specifically, each year we assign each firm into one of two groups based on whether its leverage is 
above or below the median leverage of all Compustat firms and indicate this assignment by a binary vari-
able. To separate the effect of bank monitoring, we construct another variable, defined as a binary variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the firm has high leverage and no bond rating. The results indicate that debt-
holder monitoring and bank monitoring have no significant impact on the direct issuance costs and they do 
not alter our finding that firms with weak shareholder rights pay higher gross spreads in SEOs.
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board independence is connected to greater offer price discounts. Overall, the inclusion of 
internal governance measures does not change our previous conclusion that extreme weak 
shareholder rights affect the spreads but not the discounts set by investment banks in sea-
soned equity offers.
4  Conclusions
Prior research establishes that shareholder rights affect the direct costs of debt financing. 
Motivated by the previously documented link between corporate governance and informa-
tion asymmetry, we examine whether shareholder rights are associated with the direct costs 
of issuing equity, which include the gross spread and offer price discount set by the invest-
ment bank. When underwriting an equity offer by a firm associated with weak shareholder 
rights, an investment bank might increase its potential exposure to legal liability and repu-
tational damage, especially in the presence of asymmetric information. Underwriters are 
charged with certifying the validity of the issue price, and weak governance could increase 
the potential for share misvaluation. The investment bank could thus compensate for these 
increased exposures by charging higher spreads and/or setting offer prices at deeper dis-
counts for those cases in which the issuer has weak shareholder rights.
However, a recent study by Kim and Purnanandam (2014) establishes a link between 
weak corporate governance and negative SEO announcement reactions. If the full negative 
effect of weak corporate governance is priced at the SEO announcement, then the strength 
of shareholder rights might be unrelated to the underwriter’s risk of placing overvalued 
shares, all else equal. Thus, it could very well be the case that gross spreads and offer price 
discounts are independent of shareholder rights.
We find that the strength of shareholder rights, on average, is not related to gross spreads 
or offer price discounts. Importantly, however, we find that underwriters charge higher 
gross spreads in SEOs in which the issuing firm is associated with extremely weak share-
holder rights. This result holds when we use deviations from expected levels of corporate 
governance, alternative measures of shareholder rights (E-Index or G-Index), and control 
for board characteristics. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that underwrit-
ers believe that governance-related risks are accurately assessed by investors prior to the 
issuance of new equity, on average, but that higher gross spreads are warranted for floating 
SEOs for firms with exceptionally poor governance or a level of governance that is weaker 
than expected.
Appendix: Variable definitions
This appendix provides variable definitions.
Measures of direct issuance costs
Gross underwriter spread Consists of the management fee, underwriter fee, and selling 
concession and is expressed as a percentage of total offer proceeds.
Offer price discount The percentage return from the previous day’s closing transaction 
price to the offer price (close-to-offer return), multiplied by negative one.
Measures of external governance
ATI The alternative governance index of Cremers and Nair (2005), which focuses on 
three key provisions (staggered boards, poison pills, and restrictions on shareholder vot-
ing). The measure takes a value from 0 to 3 based on the number of provisions a firm 
has in place.
E-index The entrenchment index of Bebchuk et al. (2009), which focuses on six provi-
sions within the G-index. The measure takes a value from 0 to 6.
G-index Formed following Gompers et  al. (2003) by adding one point for each anti-
takeover provision (of the 24 provisions in IRRC) that a firm has in place. Thus this 
measures can take values from 0 to 24.
Board variables
Board independence The number of independent board members as a percentage of 
total board members.
Board size Number of board members.
Insiders The number of board members that are employees as a percentage of total 
board members.
Other control variables
Analyst following Average number of analysts providing 1-year ahead earnings-per- 
share estimates (from the IBES summary files) in the 12 months prior to the issue.
AR5neg Market-adjusted return in the 5 days immediately prior to the offer if negative, 
and zero otherwise.
AR5pos Market-adjusted return in the 5 days immediately prior to the offer if positive, 
and zero otherwise.
Bond rating The Standard and Poor’s long-term issuer credit rating from Compustat 
coded numerically from AAA (19) to CCC (1). If the firm does not have a bond rating, 
it is set to zero.
Institutional holdings Shares held by institution as a percentage of total shares outstand-
ing in the quarter prior to the issue.
Integer Binary variable equaling one for offers priced at whole dollars and zero other-
wise.
Leverage Long-term debt scaled by book assets in the fiscal year prior to issue.
Market capitalization The number of shares outstanding times the price at the end of the 
most recent month prior to the issue, reported in thousands of dollars.
Market-to-book Market value of equity, scaled by the book value of assets.
Market runup Buy-and-hold return on the value-weighted market index in the 60 days 
prior to the offer.
Nasdaq Binary variable that equals 1 if the firm’s principal exchange is the Nasdaq, and 
otherwise equals 0.
Number of lead managers Number of lead managers in the SEO reported on SDC.
Offer price Price at which the issue is sold.
Overnight Indicator that the offer is conducted in an accelerated basis within two trad-
ing days of the announcements. Hand-collected prior to 2011 and taken from SDC start-
ing 2011.
Proceeds The net proceeds from the offering, measured in millions.
Relative offer size The number of shares issued divided by the number of shares out-
standing prior to the issue.
Residual volatility Residual standard deviation of the error term in the market model 
estimated over the 250 trading days prior to the issue.
Runup Market adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal stock return in the 60 days prior to the 
offer.
Turnover Average trading volume over the 250 trading days prior to the filing of the 
issue divided by the number of shares outstanding.
Underwriter previous relation Binary variable indicating that the firm had a prior equity 
underwriting relation with one of the lead underwriters in the preceding 5 years.
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